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Over the last 100 years, strong state actors have struggled to achieve policy goals 
when involved in conflicts with weaker actors. Irregular Warfare has become the tool of 
choice for weak opponents to wage war against strong actors such as the United States. 
Weak actors are achieving more frequent success against powerful opponents by using 
indirect strategies. This thesis examines the conflict interaction between weak and strong 
actors. For the strong actor, this thesis identifies that when there is limited political 
maneuver space, limited resources, and the importance of the objective is less than vital 
to national security interests, an indirect strategy becomes the most practical approach to 
combat a weaker opponent using an indirect approach. Using the aforementioned 
methodology, this thesis concludes that U.S. Army Special Forces have a comparative 
advantage over conventional forces to provide the National Command Authorities with a 
means to address indirect threats from weaker actors. 
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Choosing a strategy with the appropriate means to effectively implement that 
strategy to achieve policy goals is of great importance to any organization. However, the 
ability to develop a sound strategy and choose the correct tools to implement that strategy 
has posed a problem to organizations, of all types, for many years. Governments, in 
particular, have struggled with this issue. Governments preparing for war develop 
strategies and use their military forces to execute said strategies to achieve policy goals. 
Prior to the start of the nuclear era, this was a relatively simple concept. Large-scale 
armies and navies would fight to determine the victor in a direct conflict interaction. The 
stronger actor would normally dominate these interactions and could often impose its will 
over the weaker actor. However, within the last 100 years this dynamic has changed. 
An interesting paradigm shift has occurred within the international arena where, 
more than ever before, powerful actors can no longer count on absolute power to 
dominate military interaction with weaker actors. The French strategist, Andre Beaufre, 
said, “Because of the existence of the nuclear weapon and the agitation for 
decolonization, there is a wide field open to this (indirect) strategy and, as we shall see, it 
has become extremely complex and frighteningly effective.”1 No longer can any actor be 
certain of defeating another actor on the battlefield of the enemy’s choosing based on 
strength alone.2 Beaufre tells us that the nature of interaction between states has changed. 
Power alone is insufficient in the realm of international relations as the weak now have a 
method, the indirect strategy, to undermine the traditional advantages of the strong. The 
direct strategy, or a strategy that depends on superior resources and power, does not 
necessarily coerce an enemy any longer.3 As a result, a different approach may be 
required to achieve policy goals in an indirect conflict model.  
                                                 
1 André Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy: With Particular Reference to Problems of Defense, 
Politics, Economics, and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age (New York: Praeger, 1965), 108. 
2 Ibid., 107.  
3 Hy S. Rothstein, “Strategy and Psychological Operations,” in Information Strategy and Warfare: A 
Guide to Theory and Practice, ed. John Arquilla and Douglas A. Borer (New York: Routledge, 2007), 170. 
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Beaufre’s concept assists in selecting the appropriate strategy. Beaufre indicates 
that the indirect approach must be considered in any contest no matter the absolute power 
of the actors involved.4 According to Beaufre, a reason to select an indirect approach is 
related to an actor’s “freedom of action or freedom of maneuver.”5 Freedom of action 
refers to the physical, political, and economic maneuver space available to the actors 
involved in a conflict. If an actor finds itself at the precipice of conflict, and it is at a 
disadvantage in that its freedom to utilize all of its instruments of national power is 
restricted; then the actors involved find themselves in a situation that may require an 
indirect approach.6 
This concept is especially true for the United States. The current state of 
economic and political affairs within the United States has implications for the future use 
of the military. Today, with over 15 years of conflict, across-the-board defense cuts, force 
reductions, and war weariness have taken their toll and placed the United States in a 
position of reduced freedom of maneuver. One could assume that the U.S. National 
Command Authorities (NCA) will need a cost-effective means to achieve policy 
objectives that are both fiscally cost effective, politically acceptable, and of reduced risk 
to the nation. Additionally, with the increase of irregular warfare in the post-World War 
II world, there is a need for military units that can provide effective solutions that 
conventional military units cannot provide effectively and efficiently.  
With the exception of World War I and World War II, most of the conflicts in 
which the United States has been involved over the last century have required indirect 
strategies.7 In this thesis, indirect conflict refers to conflict interactions of an asymmetric 
                                                 
4 Sir Basil Henry Liddlel Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach. (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 
1967), 25. 
5 Beaufre, Introduction to Strategy, 27. 
6 Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart may have been one of the first strategist to consider the indirect 
approach as an effective strategy choice. Hart indicates that most actors will manifest strength and power 
outwardly, but will rely on stability, morale, and supply to project their strength. Hart also indicates that 
attacking an adversary’s political and psychological will is vital to their defeat. These concepts will be key 
to this thesis. 
7 Ivan Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict. Vol. 99 (New York, 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 4.  
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nature whereby the actors rely on insurgency or guerrilla warfare methods to overcome 
the strength and power of a stronger actor. In most of these conflicts, the United States 
has typically responded using conventional military forces executing direct strategies or 
what is referred to in a recently released RAND study as an “iron fist approach.”8 Quite 
often, the response has ended with less-than-optimal outcomes for the United States.9 In 
cases of this nature, the conflict has ended with the more powerful actor withdrawing 
before achieving its policy goals. The issue then becomes, what tools are available to 
policy makers to prevent defeat in these types of strategic interactions?10 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Do United States Special Forces (USSF) offer U.S. policy makers an effective and 
efficient alternative, to conventional military forces in achieving policy goals? If so, 
under what conditions do USSF offer strategic alternatives for achieving policy goals? 
This thesis will attempt to answer these questions. While much has been written on the 
tactical and operational impacts and the advantages of USSF, there is still relatively little 
written on the use of USSF to achieve national-level policy goals. This thesis seeks to 
address the strategic utility of USSF.  
By understanding when USSF can best be used as an instrument of national 
power, policy makers and military leaders alike have the ability to select the optimum 
tool to achieve U.S. policy goals and avoid committing large scale, expensive 
                                                 
8 Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill, and Molly Dunigan, Paths to Victory: Lessons from 
Modern Insurgencies (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2013), xxix.  
9 Paths to Victory is a recently released Rand Corporation study that analyzes counter insurgency 
efforts of 71 cases of counter insurgency since the end of World War II. The iron fist approach as used in 
the body of this thesis is taken from the Rand study and is used here to indicate the use of a more direct 
approach. In Paths to Victory the iron fist approach is defined as an enemy centric COIN strategy that sees 
insurgency as much more akin to conventional warfare. Defeat of the enemy is the primary goal of the 
counter insurgent in this method.  
10 It is important to note that this thesis assumes that the wrong forces along with inappropriate 
strategies have been and are being used to attain policy goals within the irregular conflict environment Both 
conventional military units and Special Forces can conduct indirect operations. However, this thesis 
assumes that Special Forces can do it more effectively and efficiently under certain circumstances. 
Furthermore, this thesis assumes that the most common reaction by the United States to an emerging 
indirect threat is to apply a conventional direct response (inappropriate strategy) sometimes using Special 
Forces to execute that direct response without achieving policy goals. This phenomenon has been visible 
over the last 15 years in Afghanistan. 
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conventional U.S. forces to conflicts where their very presence may undermine policy 
goals. If Special Forces do, in fact, possess a significant comparative advantage, under 
specific circumstances, and can provide strategic capabilities to U.S. policy makers with 
less political and economic risk than conventional forces, then USSF would provide the 
United States with significant effective and efficient alternatives. Therefore, USSF could 
provide an optimal solution to successfully counter future threats that necessitate indirect 
strategies.  
B. HYPOTHESIS 
Special Forces offer U.S. policy makers greater strategic utility and comparative 
advantage against indirect threats compared to conventional forces under specific 
conditions. Special Forces’ comparative advantage lies in their ability to achieve policy 
goals under the following conditions: 
1. Freedom of maneuver is restricted 
2. Resources available are constrained due to physical, fiscal, and or political 
limitations. 
3. Importance of the objective may be less than vital to the national interest 
or national survival. 
It is important to note that these conditions are not all-encompassing and there are 
other factors that affect conflict outcome, but the aforementioned factors hold significant 
importance. The key to this hypothesis is based primarily on the criteria of restricted 
freedom of maneuver, which will be discussed in Chapter II. While the importance of the 
objective and the available resources are important, Special Forces may offer the greatest 
strategic advantage when freedom of maneuver is restricted for the United States. It is 
also important to note that this thesis will focus on U.S. involvement in conflicts from 
2001–2013 and will not account for changes in U.S. policy or strategy after that time 
frame. 
This hypothesis is heavily based on Andre Beaufre’s An Introduction to Strategy. 
Beaufre suggests that indirect strategies are optimized under very specific criteria. 
Beaufre’s conditions result in the requirement to develop an indirect strategy to succeed. 
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Additionally, Ivan Arreguín-Toft’s findings in How the Weak Win Wars will be used to 
support the notion that the U.S. must be able to increasingly apply indirect strategies 
against future indirect threats. The primary assumption of Arreguín-Toft’s thesis is that in 
conflict, the type of approach each actor applies matters to its outcome. If both actors 
apply the same type of approach (direct vs. direct or indirect vs. indirect), Arreguín-
Toft’s analysis says that the stronger actor will likely win. However, if the stronger actor 
applies a direct approach and the weaker actor applies an indirect approach, the weaker 
actor becomes much more likely to win.11 Following this logic, Arreguín-Toft suggests 
that the United States should build two separate militaries, one for conventional direct 
approaches and one for unconventional indirect approaches.12 This thesis explores the 
notion that Special Forces have a comparative advantage compared to conventional 
military forces for executing indirect strategies and provides the second military force to 
which Arreguín-Toft refers. In other words, USSF has greater strategic utility under the 
proper circumstances and offer the National Command Authorities (NCA) the optimum 
force for an indirect strategy. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
To better understand and examine the hypothesis, this thesis is organized into five 
chapters, each dealing with critical elements aimed at answering the research question. 
Chapter II of this thesis focuses on providing a better understanding of indirect warfare 
and outlines the importance of possessing an appropriate strategic approach to an indirect 
conflict. Ivan Arreguín-Toft’s findings are used to provide the background for this 
chapter. Arreguín-Toft’s central thesis is, “when actors employ opposite strategic 
approaches (direct-indirect or indirect-direct), weak actors are much more likely to win, 
even when everything we think we know about power says they shouldn’t.”13 Arreguín-
Toft’s statistical data concerning conflict between different types of actors and strategies 
employed will be the primary tools used to outline the importance of choosing an 
                                                 
11 Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars, 18.  
12 Ibid., 227.  
13 Ibid., 18. 
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appropriate strategy in a conflict. This thesis will then use Andre Beaufre’s, Introduction 
to Strategy, to aid in investigating the hypothesis of this thesis. Beaufre’s logic for 
selecting an indirect strategy will be used to answer the research question of this thesis. 
Relying heavily on Arreguín-Toft and Beaufre, this thesis will show why it is important 
to execute the appropriate strategy. Ultimately, this chapter will give the reader a better 
understanding of the terms, indirect conflict, indirect strategy, and freedom of maneuver. 
Additionally, this chapter highlights not only the importance of developing an indirect 
strategy, but also the importance of possessing the proper tools to execute such a strategy 
and using those tools appropriately.  
Chapter III shifts focus from the strategy to the tools used to implement the 
strategy. USSF are examined as an organization to give the reader some understanding as 
to how Special Forces are trained, equipped, and organized. This chapter looks at current 
doctrine to determine the potential strategic utility Special Forces offer U.S. policy 
makers under the appropriate conditions. 
Chapter IV discusses several cases of conflict involving the United States. The 
first two cases look at conflicts in which both conventional forces and Special Forces 
were used to achieve the desired end state. The third case focuses on a smaller, irregular 
conflict in which Special Forces were primarily used to achieve U.S. Policy goals. 
Together, these case studies will help to determine whether USSF have a comparative 
advantage over conventional forces under the conditions previously identified.  
The first two cases to be analyzed are Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, the 
U.S. action in Afghanistan following the terrorist attacks in September of 2001 and 
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the U.S. action in Iraq to topple Saddam Hussein and 
search for weapons of mass destruction. Both of these cases are conflicts in which 
Special Forces were used in conjunction with conventional military forces to achieve 
strategic objectives. Both cases also involve the U.S. attacking its enemy with varying 
approaches (direct-direct, direct-indirect, and indirect-indirect) against an enemy that also 
varied its conflict approach. Next, this chapter will analyze U.S. actions in the Philippines 
where U.S. Special Forces were used to meet strategic objectives. These case studies will 
serve as the basis for testing the hypothesis because of their more recent relevance to U.S. 
 7
strategic choice. Likewise, these cases illustrate scenarios where USSF were used to 
achieve significant policy goals in complex and dynamic environments.  
Chapter V summarizes the findings of this thesis by tying together the concepts of 
strategic utility, indirect strategies, and how Special Forces may offer the U.S. 
government greater comparative advantage over conventional forces.  
  
 8
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II. INDIRECT APPROACHES: AN ADVANTAGE DEFINED 
To better understand how United States Army Special Forces (USSF) can provide 
significant strategic advantage for U.S. decision makers, the appropriate operational 
context in which USSF offer a comparative advantage must first be understood. To 
understand this context there are terms that must first be defined. This chapter will define 
those terms and provide an analysis of why strong actors have been losing to weaker 
actors increasingly over the past 100 years. Additionally, this chapter will outline a 
strategy that has the potential to prevent this outcome and describe the conditions in 
which the strong can increase their probability of success in irregular warfare. The 
analysis will seek to determine if a small specialized force, specifically formed and 
trained to conduct irregular warfare, has a higher probability of success than larger, 
conventional formations against the same threat. In addition, this chapter will define 
indirect conflict. Finally, this section will highlight the frequency of indirect conflict 
since World War II and examine the implications of indirect warfare on strong actors. 
A. IRREGULAR WARFARE 
Irregular warfare is a concept as old as war itself as strong actors have attempted 
to force the weak to submit to their will. Ivan Arreguín-Toft defines this form of warfare 
as “those [conflicts] in which one side is possessed of overwhelming power with respect 
to its adversary.”14 
From biblical stories of David attempting to kill the giant, Goliath, to modern 
non-state actors such as Al Qaeda attempting to undermine the United States, the weak 
have struggled against the strong and will likely continue that struggle into the 
foreseeable future. Fundamentally, the weak should not defeat the strong. A strong 
actor’s ability to outmatch the weak economically, militarily, and diplomatically should 
guarantee the stronger actor’s victory in any contest. However, according to the evidence 
presented in this section, this paradigm is beginning to shift. Since the weak cannot 
                                                 
14 Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars, xi.  
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overcome their absolute power deficit with a direct confrontation, the weak are forced to 
turn to indirect strategies to subvert the power of the strong. Weak actors use insurgency, 
guerrilla warfare, terrorism, subversion, sabotage, and various other necessary tactics to 
strike at the strong actor’s power base so that the weak can increase their freedom of 
maneuver, their will to fight, and ultimately increase their probability of success against a 
much stronger actor. This technique, the weak fighting the strong with an indirect 
approach to avoid the powerful actor’s strength, has become more common since the end 
of World War II. What is troubling, especially for powerful actors, is that the weak are 
beginning to win these interactions at an increased rate.  
The term indirect conflict, as used in this thesis, conforms with Ivan Arreguín-
Toft’s definition of the term in his book How the Weak Win Wars. Arreguín-Toft defines 
indirect conflict as conflict that seeks to undermine and destroy an adversary’s will to 
resist.15 By destroying an actor’s will to fight or resist, that actor’s physical power is 
negated. Thus, indirect conflict seeks to attack the enemy’s will to carry on the war. Most 
often, this is conducted through terrorism, insurgency, guerrilla warfare, and those tactics 
that seek to undermine the public and political support of a conflict and ultimately the 
will of the actor to fight.16 
The very nature of the indirect conflict is challenging for the weaker actor as the 
indirect approach attempts to bypass the stronger actor’s material or force advantage and 
focus on affecting their support base. Paraphrasing Arreguín-Toft, incremental losses 
caused by the indirect approach targets the political forces in the stronger actor’s 
homeland.17 This statement is referring to the fact that the indirect conflict, from the 
standpoint of the weak, seeks to capitalize on making the conflict unpalatable at home, 
thereby forcing the strong actor to withdraw from the conflict and ultimately lose or 
accept a draw with the adversary. This discussion provides a limited understanding of 
                                                 
15 Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars, 34. 
16 It is important to note here that these tactics depend on a nation’s status as a weak actor or as a 
strong actor. In the case of the weaker actor, indirect conflict consists of the terms mentioned above. In the 
case of the strong actor, indirect conflict consists of the counters to the tactics mentioned above.  
17 Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars, 34. 
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indirect conflict. However, within this narrow view lies the true nature of this type of 
conflict; protracted, unpalatable, insidious, and irregular means designed to undermine 
the enemy’s will to carry on the war and therefore negate the absolute power advantage 
that the strong actor possess.  
In any struggle, there is an expectation that persistence and power will ensure 
victory. This assumption is true whether one is referring to a boxing match or a battle 
between two armies. Absolute power should prevail in a contest between actors; prior to 
World War II this paradigm was usually the case although not without exceptions. 
Weaker actors who challenge stronger actors with direct approaches and attempt to match 
the stronger actor’s power, persistence, and resources during a conflict, lose. Estimates in 
Ivan Arreguín-Toft’s, How the Weak Win Wars, indicate that from 1800–2003, stronger 
actors succeeded in defeating weaker actors over 70 percent of the time when the same 
conflict approach was used by both actors.18 This supports the logic that an actor with 
greater resources, greater technology, and greater fighting strength will typically win 
when fighting against a weaker opponent. However, this dynamic has changed and the 
stronger actor, relying on absolute power alone, is now less likely to win.  
Since World War II, there has been a significant increase in irregular conflict 
around the world. Figures show a significant change in the results of these interactions. 
As puzzling as it may be, weaker actors win in wars more often against strong actors. 
Strong actors have struggled to develop strategies to cope with weaker adversaries that 
use indirect approaches. Also since World War II, the likelihood the stronger actor would 
achieve success against a weaker actor has dropped dramatically.19 This development is 
shown in Figure 1.  
                                                 
18 Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars, 3. 
19 Ibid., 3. 
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Figure 1.  Percentage of Conflict Victories by Type of Actor over Time.20 
As shown in Figure 1, since 1800 strong actors had been able to routinely beat 
weak actors. However, beginning in 1900, there was a significant shift and weaker actors 
began to win more often. Surprisingly, weak actors won a majority of the conflict 
interactions from 1950 to 2003.21 This data should be troubling for strong actors. 
Intuitively, the more powerful actor should not only win, but should win quickly and 
decisively. However, strong actors have vulnerabilities with regard to public and political 
support.22 Since the strong are expected to achieve a quick victory, every day that passes 
without demonstrated success represents a wane in the political will of the strong to fight. 
Once the will of the people degrades to the point of non-support, the strong abandon the 
conflict. In this way, the weak have successfully undermined the strong actor’s will to 
fight, and increased their own chances for victory. These figures now prompt the 
question: Why are weaker actors increasingly winning against stronger opponents?  
There are myriad explanations as to why strong actors are struggling to defeat 
weaker actors. One explanation given by Ivan Arreguín-Toft indicates that the strategic 
interaction between contestants has the most important impact on the results of the 
conflict.23 In other words, Arreguín-Toft says that the outcome of the conflict depends on 
                                                 
20 Adapted from Ivan Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict. 
(Vol. 99 (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005), figure used in online version of written work, 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v026/26.1toft_fig04.html. 
21 Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars, 4. 
22 Ibid., 35. 
23 Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars, 18. 
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the individual strategies employed by each actor and how those strategies relate to one 
another.24 Arreguín-Toft organizes conflict interactions into two types, direct and 
indirect. The outcome of the conflict will depend greatly on how the weak and strong 
actors apply these strategies against each other. Arreguín-Toft elaborates on this theory 
by explaining: 
when actors employ similar strategic approaches (direct-direct or indirect-
indirect) relative power explains the outcome: strong actors will win 
quickly and decisively. When actors employ opposite strategic approaches 
(direct-indirect or indirect-direct), weak actors are much more likely to 
win, even when everything we think we know about power says they 
shouldn’t.25 
In other words, if a strong actor is involved in a contest with a weak actor and the 
weak actor is using an indirect approach against a stronger actor that is using direct 
approach, statistically, the stronger actor is more likely to lose. This assessment should be 
troubling for the United States because the U.S. has experienced this phenomenon first 
hand in Vietnam and operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM. The 
aforementioned trend is represented in Figure 2. 
                                                 
24 This is not to say that strategic interactions are the only factors that determine a victor, but there is 
strong evidence in How the Weak Win Wars that demonstrates that the strategic interaction theory strongly 
lends itself to determining the victor of the conflict.  
25 Ibid., 18. 
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Figure 2.  Strategic Interaction and Asymmetric Conflict Outcomes, 
1800–200126 
As shown in Figure 2, the trend of strong actors losing to the weak is quite 
dramatic when observed through the strategic interaction lens. In interactions where the 
strong and weak actors employed the same strategy (direct-direct, indirect-indirect) the 
strong actor was able to defeat the weak actor 76 percent of the time. However, if the 
strong actor employed a different approach from the weak (direct-indirect) then the 
results reverse and we find that the weak actor wins 63 percent of the time.27 Concerning 
conflict with the United States, both strong and weak adversaries will increasingly remain 
reluctant to engage the United States with a direct approach due to resource and power 
overmatch, thus forcing the weaker adversary to employ an indirect approach. If the U.S. 
or stronger actor does not strategically engage with a similar approach, it is preparing for 
a potential defeat. 
The information presented in Figure 2 is an indication that weaker actors are 
beginning to realize they can create an advantage over strong actors and are successfully 
capitalizing on that advantage. No longer is military victory assured based on the absolute 
                                                 
26 Adapted from Ivan Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict. 
(Vol. 99 (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005), figure used in online version of written work, 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v026/26.1toft_fig04.html . 
27 It is important to note that Arreguín-Toft uses a power factor ration of 10 when calculating the 
relative power factor between combatants. For his cases, only those interactions whereby the strong 
overpowered the weak by a factor of 10:1 were considered. Therefore, the strong actors in his research are 
considerably stronger than the weak actors. 
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power of an actor. Today, there is a requirement to economically, politically, and 
psychologically affect the ability of an actor to wage war.28 Now that the weak are 
adopting strategies to defeat stronger actors, the strong must adapt their strategies 
accordingly. As the data indicates, if the strong wish to increase their odds of winning an 
indirect conflict against a weak actor, the strong must adopt a strategic approach similar 
to that of the weak. This approach is the indirect strategy. 
1. Indirect Strategy 
The previous section shows that powerful actors are increasingly losing to weaker 
actors based mostly on faulty strategic choices. While the indirect strategy appears to be 
the best solution to counter weaker actors that use indirect approaches, strong actors seem 
to prefer direct strategies. According to the data, there is a real threat to strong actors and 
an increasing need for strong actors to employ indirect strategies.  
Indirect strategy is a broad term that is vague and difficult to apply without having 
the proper context. This section will define indirect strategy as it applies to strategic 
interactions between strong and the weak actors. The definition will be organized into 
three parts that will aid in explaining the meaning of the term as it relates to the 
hypothesis of this thesis; Special Forces offer U.S. policy makers greater strategic utility 
and comparative advantage against indirect threats compared to conventional forces 
under specific conditions. Finally, this section will focus on the types of units that can 
most effectively and efficiently execute an indirect strategy.  
The indirect strategy is focused on affecting an adversary by avoiding a head-to-
head confrontation. Andre Beaufre further defines the indirect strategy by paraphrasing 
Liddell Hart’s definition and explaining that the indirect strategy seeks to avoid the trial 
by strength and attack him only after the adversary is distracted by some unexpected 
effect.29 Beaufre continues to elaborate on the concept by indicating that the indirect 
strategy is a must for an actor that cannot be sure one’s own strength can overcome an 
                                                 
28 Andrew Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,” World 
Politics 27, no. 2 (January1975): 195. doi:10.2307/2009880. 
29 Beaufre, Introduction to Strategy, 107. 
 16
adversary.30 Both Beaufre and Liddell Hart offer a prelude to Arreguín-Toft’s findings. 
The indirect strategy is a necessary means to defeat an adversary when absolute power 
alone is not sufficient. In the context of Beaufre and Liddell Hart, the indirect strategy 
generally is referenced only when speaking about actors that are weak. However, when 
confronted with a weak adversary using an indirect approach, strong actors lose the 
ability to rely on absolute strength alone and therefore in terms of relative power are no 
stronger than their weaker opponent and, in fact, may be weaker from a political and 
public will perspective. 
For a strong actor, such as the United States, there are three main factors involved 
when choosing to implement an indirect strategy to win a conflict. Obviously, there are 
many other considerations involved in national security policy decisions, but these three 
factors have the greatest potential to impact the outcome of the conflict. These factors 
place limitations on strong actors that have a direct correlation with the strong actor’s 
ability to influence through absolute power. The factors include freedom of maneuver, 
resource limitations, and the importance of the objective. It is important to note that these 
factors should be measured in relation to the adversary. For example, freedom of 
maneuver of the United States relative to the Vietnamese must be considered when 
conducting an analysis of the Vietnam conflict. Each of these factors has a level of 
influence on the need of the strong actor to employ an indirect strategy. However, 
freedom of maneuver is by far the most influential of the factors for the stronger actor. 
The next section will outline each concept and explain how it affects the need for an 
indirect strategy.  
2. Freedom of Maneuver 
As Liddell Hart indicates, strategy forms the method of conflict execution and 
determines how the actor will conduct itself in the conflict.31 An indirect strategy serves 
as the plan for how an actor can approach an indirect threat without succumbing to the 
                                                 
30 Ibid., 109. 
31 Liddell Hart, Strategy 2d rev ed., 319. 
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phenomenon mentioned by Arreguín-Toft’s data in the previous section. The indirect 
strategy focuses on methods aimed at destroying an adversary’s will to resist and 
continue to fight.  
“Will to resist” is an ambiguous concept. Drawing from Andre Beaufre’s 
findings, the will to resist can be thought of in terms of freedom of maneuver. For 
Beaufre, freedom of maneuver refers to the physical boundaries that confine the conflict 
to include the repercussions that the conflict may have on the international community.32 
This thesis expands on that idea.  
Freedom of maneuver then becomes the physical and political space an actor 
occupies that must be considered to wage war. Political freedom of maneuver will often 
define this space and can be a severely limiting factor that affects the strategy decision of 
an actor. Political will refers to the psychological ability of the actor to continue the 
conflict. Political will is affected not only by external influences of the international 
community, but also by domestic internal politics. This is especially true in democratic 
nations such as the United States.33 Some sort of coalition or the consent of an 
international organization is usually necessary to wage war. Without such consent, 
freedom of maneuver is reduced significantly. Internally, war weariness and disapproval 
of long and costly conflicts have a direct negative impact on the freedom of maneuver 
granted to a nation waging war. In other words, for a democratic nation, in the absence of 
clear success, the will to carry on the conflict diminishes over time.  
By utilizing an indirect strategy, an actor can mitigate some of these limiting 
factors. In the post-World War II era, freedom of maneuver still fits its classical 
definition, but increasingly the dynamic influences of the information age on domestic 
and international audiences, which ultimately affect political will, must be taken into 
account. Freedom of maneuver applies to all actors directly involved and on the periphery 
and can have severe implications on the conduct of a conflict. Whenever an actor’s 
                                                 
32 Beaufre, Introduction to Strategy, 108. 
33 Will to carry on the conflict applies less to actors that have authoritarian regimes. The authoritarian 
government is not bound by its people, in most cases, and can execute a conflict with any strategy is deems 
appropriate. The United States does not fit into this category.  
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freedom of maneuver is reduced, be it from economic issues at home, political 
complexities abroad, or from the war weariness of its own people, a country may find 
itself in a situation where it cannot bring the full power of its military to bear to pursue its 
policy objectives. Therefore, freedom of maneuver becomes the most important element 
of an indirect approach due to the effect an actor’s freedom of maneuver will have on its 
ability to expend resources and how the importance of the objective will be viewed from 
a political and public perspective. As this freedom of maneuver decreases, an actor 
increasingly must seek the best possible way to maximize the use of his decreased 
maneuver space and resource limitations to achieve his policy goals.34 Otherwise, the 
actor risks limiting his options to the point where he can no longer sustain a conflict and 
thus will be forced to accept a less-than-optimal outcome.  
When a strong actor, such as the United States, has diminished freedom of 
maneuver, an indirect strategy becomes a plausible option to mitigate the strong actor’s 
loss of maneuver space. As previously stated, the indirect strategy seeks to attack the 
adversary’s will to fight and as a result decreases the actor’s ability to wage war. 
Therefore, with decreased freedom of maneuver it may be prudent for the actor to choose 
an indirect strategy to succeed.35 
3. Resources 
Another factor that can affect the decision of a strong actor to choose a strategy is 
the availability of resources relative to one’s opponent. The main resources that influence 
the need for an indirect strategy include, but are not limited to, economic resources and 
military power. While this category is not as important as the freedom of maneuver, it 
still has significant bearing on the strategy an actor will employ in a conflict. 
It is obvious that limited economic resources may force decision makers to choose 
a particular type of strategy for a conflict. In acknowledging this assumption, this thesis 
assumes indirect approaches require more time to succeed. A recent Rand study indicates 
                                                 
34 Beaufre, Introduction to Strategy, 109. 
35 Liddell Hart, Strategy 2d rev ed., 320. 
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that the mean duration of an insurgency is 128 months.36 The report also shows that the 
mean duration for winning an insurgency is 152.2 months and the mean duration for 
losing is 112 months.37 The assumption is that most indirect conflicts will be protracted. 
A strong actor who must counter the indirect strategy of a weaker actor will thus face the 
proposition of planning for a long-duration conflict and mitigating its political effects. 
Even if the actor begins a conflict on economically sound ground, there is no guarantee 
that this condition will persist for the duration of the conflict. Large, powerful militaries 
are expensive to maintain and extremely expensive to employ, especially in long 
conflicts. To add to that expense, an actor’s military power cannot affect an adversary 
unless the military can effectively target the enemy either kinetically or non-kinetically. 
In other words, the strongest military in the world, using all of its technology and 
advanced weaponry, cannot kill an enemy unless the enemy can be seen. If a small agile 
adversary can effectively hide from targeting efforts, then the strong actor’s operating 
costs increase exponentially across time. Optimally, a small cost-effective force capable 
of developing solutions to intelligence gaps could provide a strong actor with a solution 
to the dilemma of targeting the unseen. 
Closely linked to the economic viability of an actor is the power and size of the 
actor’s military. Possessing a military that is strong enough to guarantee military victory 
ebbs and flows with the perceived threats to the actor in question. Generally speaking, 
when perceived threats to the security of the actor in question are high, the military 
generally flourishes; when perceived threats subside, the military will generally shrink in 
size and lose capability. This is evident in the current political, economic, and social 
situation in the United States. As the perceived threat to U.S. security has dwindled and 
the United States removes itself from theaters of conflict, the military shrinks and along 
with it, so does the military’s capability.  
                                                 
36 Paul, Clarke, Grill, and Dunigan, Paths to Victory, xxxi. 
37 It is important to note this study focused only on counter-insurgency (COIN) case studies following 
World War II and not all forms of irregular warfare were included. The report analyzed 71 separate 
instances of COIN for the report. The report focuses primarily on insurgency and COIN as a tactic and does 
not analyze strategic interactions between actors. 
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4. Importance of the Objectives 
The last factor affecting the decision for choosing a strategy concerns the 
importance of the object. Specifically, does the threat affect the survival of the actor or its 
allies? If the survival of the actor is in question, then the importance of the objective will 
be high and have the support of the people. If the survival of the actor is not in question, 
then the importance of the objective will generally be lower and support for the conflict 
will be more likely to waiver.  
For a strong actor, national survival will rarely be at stake in an indirect conflict 
(against a strong or weak actor). Arreguín-Toft’s research demonstrates that indirect 
approaches to conflicts are becoming more and more common. Therefore, in most cases, 
strong actors are less willing to fight and less willing to risk large expenditures of 
national treasure in a conflict that has relatively low importance for them.  
B. IMPLICATIONS 
The previous section has organized the elements that should affect the decision to 
choose an indirect strategy. What does it mean and what are the implications if a strong 
actor finds that it must engage another actor in conflict and the stronger actor has 
significantly limited resources due to reduced political will or reduced freedom of 
maneuver, and the importance of the objective is less than vital? This chapter suggests 
the strong actor should engage in an indirect strategic interaction with its adversary (if the 
adversary is using an indirect strategic interaction) to increase the likelihood of success. 
In an indirect conflict, the strong actor must optimize their diminished freedom of 
maneuver to achieve a higher probability of success. 
C. COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE IN INDIRECT STRATEGIES 
Militaries around the world have executed indirect strategies since wars have been 
fought. Both conventional militaries and special operations forces have been used to 
execute indirect strategies. However, there are certain characteristics that make certain 
units particularly adept at implementing indirect strategic approaches. While this thesis 
has argued, based on Arreguín-Toft and Beaufre’s findings, that the strategy choice is 
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important to the outcome of a conflict, this thesis also assumes that the type of unit 
chosen to execute the strategy is equally as important. This section will cover the basic 
differences between U.S. conventional forces and U.S. Army Special Forces to include 
their nature, comparative advantages, and risks associated with employing each unit. 
Ultimately, this section will identify which unit is best suited for executing an indirect 
strategy against a weak actor who is executing an indirect strategy under the conditions 
described in the hypothesis in Chapter I.  
The nature of indirect conflict has been covered earlier in this chapter. To 
reiterate, this type of warfare is typically protracted, political, unorthodox, and aimed at 
attacking the will of an adversary to continue to fight. To understand whether 
conventional forces or USSF is better suited to accomplish an indirect strategy, one must 
first derive the strategic value of each unit. This section will focus on understanding the 
strategic value of each unit.  
Conventional military forces are often capable of executing an indirect strategy 
within an asymmetric conflict. Since 2001 and the initial invasion of Afghanistan and 
with the subsequent invasion in Iraq, the U.S. saw conventional military forces engaged 
in asymmetric warfare with an enemy ultimately using an indirect strategy. Conventional 
forces have moved along the spectrum of conflict from engaging in a direct strategy 
against enemy forces to executing large-scale indirect strategies in the form of counter 
insurgency (COIN) throughout both conflicts. Conventional military forces have met 
both success and failure while engaged in these theaters. To understand the strategic 
value of conventional forces we must look at the nature of the force, the advantages 
conventional forces offer, and the risk associated with this type of force in an indirect 
conflict. 
Conventional forces are equipped and trained to fight and win wars by directly 
engaging the military forces of the enemy. An example of this sentiment is apparent in 
the United States Army Armor Branch’s mission statement listed on the Maneuver Center 
of Excellence’s (MCoE) website: 
The Armor School trains, educates and inspires soldiers and leaders in 
fulfilling the obligations of the Army profession, to be critical and creative 
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thinkers, and to close with and destroy the enemy by fire and movement as 
part of a combined arms team in a complex environment and against a 
hybrid threat; thereby fostering the development of adaptable and lethal 
combat and reconnaissance and security formation in support of the 
operating force.38 
While this mission statement is associated only with the U.S. Armor Branch, 
much can be extracted from the statement about conventional forces. This mission 
statement captures the essence of the nature of conventional military forces. That nature 
is to engage enemies of the United States in direct combat, to close with and destroy the 
enemy, and to do so quickly. Elements of this can also be seen in the U.S. Army 
publication ADP 3–0, Unified Land Operations. While this publication is focused on 
creating an army that is adaptive and agile, capable of conducting any type of warfare, 
the manual points out the importance of the physical destruction of the enemy, and how 
that task is the foundation of all military operations.39 This idea supports the fact that the 
true nature of conventional forces is still based on direct conflict that is symmetrical. This 
does not mean that conventional forces cannot execute an indirect military strategy; this 
only indicates that conventional forces can struggle with implementing an indirect 
strategy as it is contrary to their nature. Large formations that are ill suited to conduct 
indirect operations can undermine one’s own objectives due to increased resource 
expenditure for a questionable return of investment. Furthermore, large conventional 
formations create expectations for a quick victory, thereby shortening the timeline for 
operations that may require extended interaction with local people. Finally, having many 
U.S. “boots on the ground” can undermine the legitimacy of the operation and host nation 
authorities.40  
United States Army Special Forces offer policy makers a unique tool to execute 
an indirect strategy against and adversary using the same strategy. Their small size, 
economy of force, specialized training, and regional expertise make them well suited to 
                                                 
38 U.S. Army Armor School website, Mission Statement, December 6, 2013, 
http://www.benning.army.mil/armor/index.html.  
39 U.S. Army, “ADP 3–0 Unified Land Operations.” (2011). 
40 Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars, 35. 
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implement an indirect strategy. According to the U.S. Army Field Manual FM 3–18, 
Special Forces Operations: 
Special Forces operations have also proven to be an extremely useful 
option for certain situations during peacetime and contingencies, where 
the use of large military units and operations would have been 
inappropriate, counterproductive, or too risky. When used effectively, 
these types of operations can yield disproportional benefits.41  
This statement gets at the heart of the hypothesis of this thesis in that Special 
Forces offer policy makers a valuable tool to respond to indirect threats with an indirect 
strategy. FM 3–18 further elaborates on the type of soldiers who populate Special Forces 
teams. In general, Special Forces soldiers are independent, adaptable, mature, innovative, 
culturally aware, self-assured, and self-reliant individuals who can be used to expand the 
strategic options for the NCA for conflict resolution.42 USSF’s economy of force reduces 
the risk of escalating a conflict that the mere presence of conventional forces may 
promulgate.43  
This section has attempted to identify the primary differences in capabilities and 
the nature of both conventional forces and Special Forces. This section’s intent was to 
identify the situations that are best suited for the utilization of each type of force. By 
conducting a cursory examination of U.S. Army doctrine, it appears that U.S. Special 
Forces selects, trains, and organizes units that are more capable of implementing an 
indirect strategy in support of policy goals. While both entities have been shown capable 
of implementing indirect strategies, it appears that USSF may be better suited for this 
type of strategy.44  
                                                 
41 U.S. Army, “FM 3–18 Special Forces Operations.” (2012), 1–2. 
42 Ibid., 1–10. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Critiques of this hypothesis exist. Paraphrasing James D. Kiras in the book Special Operations and 
Strategy, special operations and specifically Special Forces can be extremely effective when used in an 
indirect strategy, but should not be separated from conventional forces and more often than not, should be 
in a supporting role to conventional forces. Kiras acknowledges the need for an indirect strategy through 
what Kiras calls the “cumulative effect against the moral resolve of the enemy,” but he does not 
acknowledge that special operations and more specifically Special Forces would be better suited for this 
type of warfare in a supported role as opposed to a supporting role to conventional forces.  
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This section has shown that indirect warfare is on the rise and that an indirect 
strategy applied by a stronger actor statistically increases that actor’s likelihood of 
success when encountering a threat employing an indirect strategy. In addition, this 
section has shown that USSF are better suited than conventional forces to implement an 
indirect strategy. Conventional forces possess capabilities that are designed to close with 
and destroy the enemy. Confrontations between known combatants where military power 
can be used at a decisive point to degrade or destroy the enemy lies at the heart of what 
conventional forces are designed to accomplish. However, today’s threats are not 
particularly vulnerable to traditional military power. 
USSF are a small-scale and cost-effective alternative specifically designed to use 
indirect strategies to solve complex problems, assuming that USSF are employed 
correctly. USSF provide a tool that can accomplish policy objectives where conventional 
forces cannot operate effectively. USSF possess the ability to achieve strategic effects 
while maintaining a small footprint that mitigates the political and economic costs of 
waging war. It is important to note that Special Forces will not always be the best choice 
for indirect strategies nor will they always be successful. As demonstrated in the last 15 
years of fighting during the global war on terror (GWOT), USSF can be improperly 
employed. As an example, USSF with well-trained commando partners provided 
extremely capable and agile elements to respond to emerging local and regional crises. 
These combined elements were used in Afghanistan and Iraq as direct action forces 
executing surgical strike missions.45 USSF has a key role to ensure they are properly 
employed. Recent years of fighting in both Iraq and Afghanistan have seen Special 
Forces conducting more direct than indirect strategic approaches. USSF must carefully 
consider their mission to maximize strategic utility in an indirect context. The next 
chapter will better explain why USSF are better suited to implement indirect strategies by 
                                                 
45 The author observed this action during a deployment as a Special Forces Officer from 2008-2009 to 
Regional Command East in Afghanistan. While working with NATO Special Operations Forces the author 
observed USSF assigned to the Operation ENDURING FREEDOM U.S. mission perform this mission. 
USSF with Afghan Commandos operated as a strike force in Regional Command East conducting direct 
action raids against Taliban strongholds. They were used more and more for their flexibility and speed to 
react.  
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focusing on the organization and primary missions of USSF. This will show the reader 
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III. SPECIAL FORCES 
The previous chapter describes the rise of indirect threats, the need for a strong 
actor to develop indirect strategies to counter those threats, and the need of possessing 
military units capable of implementing indirect strategies. This chapter focuses on the 
type of unit needed to implement a successful indirect strategy against an indirect threat. 
Specifically, this chapter will focus on United States Army Special Forces (USSF) as a 
means to implement an indirect strategy. This chapter will begin by providing a brief 
history of USSF to understand of how the unit was designed and for what purpose it was 
intended to be used. Next, the focus will shift from the historical context to the modern 
use of Special Forces. The current responsibility for missions directed by the U.S. 
Department of Defense will be outlined with a particular focus on Unconventional 
Warfare (UW) and Foreign Internal Defense (FID). Even though USSF have 
requirements to fill many roles, these two missions will be emphasized due to their 
connection to executing indirect strategies. Finally, this chapter will analyze USSF’s 
utility in an indirect strategy and determine if USSF possess any advantage over 
conventional forces within the context of indirect strategies.  
A. HISTORY 
To understand how USSF can be appropriately used to implement an indirect 
strategy it is necessary to first gain a brief understanding of the history of the unit and the 
intention behind its original design. By gaining a better understanding of USSF’s past, 
their current employment and potential can be better understood.  
The United States Army Special Forces officially began in 1951 due to the rising 
communist threat during the Cold War and the need for a force capable of executing 
Unconventional Warfare (UW) to counter Soviet attempts to expand their influence into 
Western Europe.46 However, USSF lineage can be traced back before World War II. At 
                                                 
46 Susan L. Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1997), 11. 
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the beginning of World War II, the U.S. military did not possess a special operations 
capability that would allow the United States to take part in irregular warfare. Unlike 
Great Britain, the U.S. did not possess an established structure that could focus on 
conducting psychological operations, sabotage, subversion, or espionage.47 William 
Donovan, a proven World War I officer, successfully lobbied President Roosevelt to 
create an organization that could fill this capability gap.48 The organization that was 
created was the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).49 To paraphrase Susan Marquis’ 
version of Donovan’s original mission statement; the OSS’ mission was to use any means 
available to destroy the enemy’s will to fight and disrupt his political and economic 
ability to engage in warfare. Additionally, the OSS was to conduct military operations, to 
include psychological warfare, to deny an enemy support from its allies while 
maximizing one’s own support and increasing the friendly actor’s will to fight.50 In other 
words, the OSS was focused on undermining support to an enemy while increasing 
friendly support to affect each actor’s will to fight. Once Donovan was able to organize 
the OSS, the unit quickly began operating throughout the European theater of operations. 
During the course of the war, the OSS deployed 97 separate teams into Europe and 
achieved much success.51 Additionally, the OSS successfully established a unit in the 
India, China, and Burma theaters of operation. Detachment 101 was established to 
conduct UW throughout Burma, to undermine the occupation of the Japanese military in 
that theater. Detachment 101 achieved a high degree of success executing an indirect 
strategy in support of the war effort.  
                                                 
47 Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces, 9. 
48 Susan Marquis indicates in her book, Unconventional Warfare, which the British possessed a 
capability that could conduct tasks associated with indirect strategies. William Donovan wished to create an 
organization that was modeled after the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) that could conduct 
unconventional warfare in denied areas to support the war effort. The effort was not initially widely 
supported by the military and President Roosevelt had to intervene personally in order to get the effort off 
of the ground. 
49 Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces, 9. 
50 Ibid., 9. 
51 Ibid. 
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This new and highly successful special operations capability would not last long. 
After the war, the OSS deactivated and the U.S. would not possess a unit with the 
specific capability of implementing an indirect strategy through UW until well into the 
conflict in Korea. Even after the establishment of a Special Forces unit, the unit was not 
used in Korea to carry out UW missions. However, there were individual units 
conducting special operations in the Korea theater of operations, but no unified effort to 
maintain an indirect capability. It was not until 1951 that Aaron Bank and Russell 
Volkmann began to rebuild the U.S. Army’s special warfare capability and created the 
first Special Forces unit, 10th Special Forces Group (SFG). According to Marquis, 10th 
Special Forces Group’s initial mission statement written by Bank and Volkmann was to, 
“infiltrate by air, sea, or land deep into enemy-controlled territory and to stay, organize, 
equip, train, control, and direct indigenous personnel in the conduct of Special Forces 
Operations.”52 
The creation of the 10th Special Forces Group marked the official birth of modern 
USSF. The organizational design, centered on a 12-man team concept called Operational 
Detachment Alphas (ODAs), has remained unchanged since the creation of the 10th SFG. 
Positions and specialties on the teams have changed somewhat due to operational need, 
but the original concept of having regionally aligned small units, consisting of highly 
trained individuals and maintaining the capability to conduct unconventional warfare has 
remained largely unchanged.53  
It is apparent from both mission statements above that USSF and its predecessors 
were created to conduct warfare that sought indirect confrontations against the United 
States’ enemies. Although Donovan’s mission statement for the OSS is extensive and 
contrasts with Bank and Volkmann’s mission statement that is rather short and vague, it 
                                                 
52 Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces, 11. 
53 Volumes have been written on the complete history of Special Forces. This section of the thesis 
only gives an overview of some of the critical points in USSF’s creation. The intent is to give the reader 
some sense of the purpose of creating and maintaining such a unit. The purpose of USSF as used in this 
thesis is to conduct UW and FID as a way to implement an indirect strategy in support of national policy 
goals to reduce the enemy’s freedom of maneuver and increase or at least maximize the use of the friendly 
freedom of maneuver.  
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is evident from both statements that the role of each unit was to reduce the will of the 
enemy to fight and increase the will of friendly indigenous forces to fight. This statement 
resonates closely with what Beaufre indicates as when choosing an indirect strategy. That 
is to reduce the political and economic space in which the enemy can operate, while 
maximizing the use of friendly space. This should be thought of in terms of freedom of 
maneuver.54 
B. MODERN USSF MISSION 
To gain a thorough understanding of how USSF can be employed within the 
context of an indirect strategy, this section of the chapter will define Special Forces’ 
current mission. Additionally, this section will define and analyze USSF’s two primary 
missions and how those missions represent indirect strategies. By understanding these 
missions, the nature and the role of USSF can be understood and thus a better vision of 
how USSF can be used against indirect threats will emerge.  
U.S. Army Field Manual 3–18, Special Forces Operations states:  
United States Army Special Forces is the Department of Defense’s only 
force specifically trained and educated to shape foreign political and 
military environments by working through and with host nations…Special 
Forces Soldiers possess capabilities that enable both lethal and nonlethal 
missions specifically designed to shape the environment, deter conflict, 
prevail in war, or succeed in a wide range of contingency operations.55 
By doctrine, USSF is specifically designed to shape the political and military 
environment during war, conflict, or peacetime engagement. USSF provides the NCA 
with a specifically trained force capable of implementing both direct and indirect 
strategies in a variety of ways. USSF provides the capability to implement national 
security strategies outside of overt conventional military campaigns, acts as a force 
multiplier and enabler in support of military campaigns, and can be used in an economy 
                                                 
54 Beaufre explains in his book, An Introduction to Strategy, that freedom of maneuver is a variable in 
selecting a strategy. This thesis assumes that increasing or decreasing freedom of maneuver also can be 
used in determining if an indirect strategy as a means of conflict resolution is suitable. Beaufre does not 
specifically state this in his book, but is a key assumption to this thesis. 
55 Headquarters, Department of the Army, “(FM 3–18) Special Forces Operations.” (2012), 1–1. 
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of force role.56 Due to the unit’s small size and unique capabilities, USSF provide the 
NCA with a capability to respond to indirect threats that is low risk, unlike that of a large-
scale deployment of conventional forces.57 Additionally, the nature of the Special Forces 
Soldier facilitates lower visibility, indirect strategies. The type of soldier that is recruited, 
selected, and trained to be a member of Special Forces defines the nature of the force. 
The USSF Soldier is a mature, innovative, independent, and capable of working with 
indigenous civilian populations and military forces to support U.S. national interests.58 
With soldiers possessing highly developed skills and organized into small units, USSF 
provide the NCA with a tool optimized for executing an indirect strategy against an 
indirect threat.  
USSF missions consist of a wide array of tasks and activities that are designed to 
support the United States’ national security strategy. The missions span the spectrum of 
warfare ranging from offensive, defensive, and stability operations. However, two 
missions stand out that serve as the cornerstone of Special Forces operations since the 
beginnings of the unit’s history. These missions are Unconventional Warfare (UW) and 
Foreign Internal Defense (FID) and both missions comfortably fall within the realm of 
indirect strategies. While each mission can be conducted in support of a direct strategy, 
the nature of both UW and FID are more indirect and are intended to achieve results that 
are disproportionate to the size of the unit that is involved.59 UW and FID are considered 
by U.S. Army Field Manual FM 3–18 to be conceptual opposites. UW focuses on the use 
of a resistance force to overthrow an occupying power while FID is focused on enabling 
governments to protect themselves and their people from subversion, insurgency, 
terrorism, and lawlessness.60 The following sections will define both UW and FID in 
more detail, and then explain how each mission uses an indirect strategy. 
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1. Unconventional Warfare 
UW served as the catalyst for the creation of the OSS and serves presently as the 
backbone of the United States Army Special Forces. Unconventional warfare directed 
against the Soviets is the reason that USSF was created. 61 UW is one of USSF nine core 
competencies or missions and is defined in U.S. Army Techniques Publication ATP 3–
05.1 as: 
Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to 
coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by 
operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in 
a denied area.62 
UW was initially designed to weaken and disrupt an occupying power to facilitate 
its overthrow. The OSS used UW in Europe and Burma during World War II to disrupt 
the Axis Powers and to facilitate conventional operations leading up to D-Day and 
beyond. UW today is still oriented at the disruption of an occupying power or enemy 
government. According to Army Techniques Publication ATP 3–05.1, the complexities 
of the current and future operational environments, along with the diffusion of power 
from nation states to the many stakeholders involved in the international community, has 
resulted in an environment whereby traditional military and economic elements of 
national power may be less effective or even inappropriate for achieving U.S. policy 
goals.63 The eventual aim of a UW campaign is to overthrow or at a minimum disrupt an 
enemy or occupying force using and indirect strategy. Stated in more simple terms, UW 
as a primary method to deny a threat actor’s freedom of maneuver and to capitalize on 
one’s own freedom of maneuver. Since UW is typically conducted in denied areas or 
through surrogates in denied areas, it is assumed that in a situation where UW is needed, 
the United States’ freedom of maneuver will be restricted to some degree. Due to this 
restriction, the U.S. needs to effectively and efficiently use the strategic space available; 
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both physically and politically, while denying the same to its enemy. This makes UW an 
ideal tool to use within the framework of an indirect strategy as it seeks to undermine the 
will of the enemy to fight while increasing or at least maintaining one’s own will to fight. 
2. Foreign Internal Defense 
FM 3–18 defines FID as the following:  
Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of 
the action programs taken by another government or other designated 
organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, 
insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security.64 
The primary intent of FID is to stabilize an actor/government from within and 
prevent an enemy from undermining the actor’s will to resist.65 As stated previously, FID 
is the conceptual opposite of UW. UW is a mission that is unique to USSF alone. This is 
not the case with FID. Conventional forces along with Special Operations Forces (SOF) 
can conduct FID. However, USSF possesses a unique advisory capability and regional 
expertise that conventional forces do not have, allowing USSF to conduct FID with a 
unique cultural understanding that is not present in conventional forces. As indicated in 
U.S. Army Field Manual FM 3–18, FID is conducted during both times of peace and 
conflict and consists of indirect support to an actor that can include training exercises, 
limited direct military assistance, and advisory operations.66 In addition, conventional 
military forces are not trained and organized to conduct FID. FID requires conventional 
military forces to focus on tasks not related to their primary function.  
FID is closely related to UW. It is a mission that can be conducted to support a 
strategy that is either offensive or defensive in nature. FID conducted by USSF offers 
                                                 




policy makers another tool to implement an indirect strategy in support of policy 
objectives that is low risk for both the U.S. and the host nation.67 
3. Special Forces Use in an Indirect Strategy 
Now that there is a general understanding of USSF’s history and missions, the 
question of how USSF fits into the context of an indirect strategy must be addressed. 
USSF gives the NCA indirect options by providing an economical force, which occupies 
a small footprint, and potentially delivers a disproportionate return on investment 
compared to conventional forces. Both missions can be conducted overtly or 
clandestinely and clearly fall within the realm of an indirect strategy.68 UW is aimed at 
undermining the freedom of maneuver of an enemy while capitalizing on the maneuver 
space made available to friendly forces while FID is aimed at creating and expanding a 
friendly forces freedom of maneuver prior to and during a conflict. Each mission is 
designed to be used as an indirect approach against an enemy when a conventional, direct 
approach is not a viable option. USSF utilizing UW or FID provide the NCA with options 
when resources are limited, when the survival of the United States is not at risk, and 
when reduced freedom of maneuver exists based on the political or geographic 
complexities of the conflict. USSF has a clear comparative advantage over conventional 
forces within the previously described context. Not only is USSF more palatable to policy 
makers due to their low visibility, but there is reduced risk of a conflict escalating when 
USSF is used to perform UW or FID in support of an indirect strategy.  
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IV. CASE-STUDY ANALYSIS 
This thesis seeks to test the hypothesis and answer the research question: Do 
United States Special Forces (USSF) offer U.S. policy makers an effective and efficient 
alternative, to conventional military forces in achieving policy goals. The conditions 
under which USSF can be used in an indirect approach are examined using Beaufre’s 
metrics for freedom of maneuver, relative available resources, and the importance of the 
objective. In this chapter, three cases in which USSF were used to achieve policy goals—
in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines—are analyzed. These conflicts are examined 
from the U.S. perspective, using a model of strategic interaction with the adversary 
(direct vs. direct, direct vs. indirect, etc.) and Beaufre’s metrics. The chapter concludes 
with identifying conditions where USSF has a potential strategic advantage. 
A. AFGHANISTAN 
On September 11, 2001, the method by which the United States conducts warfare 
changed significantly if briefly. The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New 
York City and the Pentagon in Washington, DC, forced the United States into a conflict-
resolution paradigm for which it was unprepared. A highly visible, complex attack was 
perpetrated on American soil by a non-state actor using asymmetric means,69 creating a 
paradigm shift for which that the DOD was unable to devise an immediate response to 
meet the urgent requirements of the commander in chief. As planning efforts began, it 
became clear that any countermove would take months to craft and execute.70 Planning 
initiatives began in Central Command, the DOD’s geographical combatant command—a 
bureaucratic, conventional military organization that is responsible for operations and 
activities within Afghanistan. Concurrently, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was 
preparing intelligence assets, CIA paramilitary teams, local Afghan opposition, and 
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USSF for an unconventional-warfare operation.71 The United States could not mobilize 
and employ a conventional military response to Afghanistan quickly enough. The CIA 
plan required the support of USSF teams and represented the quickest and most capable 
response option available. This specialized response element proved to be agile and 
extremely effective in defeating Al Qaeda and the Taliban in the opening days of the 
conflict in Afghanistan.  
By September 26, agents of the CIA made it to Afghanistan and began laying the 
groundwork for the intelligence plan.72 Over the next few months, and until the 
disruption of the Taliban in December 2001, the U.S. actually waged a direct conflict 
against a state actor employing a direct-conflict methodology. The U.S. fielded a wide 
array of aerial attack tools, including cruise-missile strikes and precision bombing, 
guided by the U.S.-advised Afghan Northern Alliance, against a conventionally arrayed 
enemy using a direct approach.73 Members of the 5th Special Forces Group were 
deployed to Afghanistan with simple instructions: link up with the Northern Alliance and 
capture Kabul.74 The success that SOF achieved between October and December was 
significant. The Taliban, initially a conventional military force, attempted to fight the 
combined U.S. and Northern Alliance in a classic direct approach. The U.S. excelled in 
targeting a visible enemy and was happy to exchange blows at an exponentially higher 
operating cost to the Taliban. By November, Kabul had fallen and the Taliban were on 
the run.75 The victory was short lived. After their disintegration in December 2001, the 
remnants of the Taliban slowly changed their conflict methodology.76 However, the U.S. 
failed to adapt to the shifting paradigm. The Army’s 10th Mountain Division 
headquarters, typically responsible for the command and control of a conventional light-
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infantry division of approximately 10,000 soldiers, was deployed to Afghanistan to 
command and control all military operations within the country.77 The Special Forces 
warfighters on the ground now had two additional levels of approval to gain permission 
to confront the enemy. As Hy S. Rothstein indicates in Afghanistan and the Troubled 
Future of Unconventional Warfare, “As the war became increasingly unconventional, the 
command and control arrangements became more conventional.”78 The war was being 
managed by an organization that had no means to see an enemy that blended into the 
population, targeted the U.S. effectively, and out-paced the United States decision-
making and execution processes.  
1. Conflict Interaction 
Afghanistan presented evolving hybrid conflict interactions as the character of the 
conflict changed.79 Hostilities began, as a hybrid, interstate conflict between states, the 
U.S. and the Taliban-governed Afghanistan. State on state war morphed into a counter-
insurgency, with the United States in the lead, fighting a non-state actor.80 The conflict 
methodology used by the U.S. from October 2001–December 2001 was hybrid, 
consisting of direct and indirect approaches against the Taliban, who used direct 
approaches. The United States used highly qualified and capable small teams to degrade 
the conventionally arrayed Taliban to the point of near defeat—at which point the 
conflict morphed into an insurgency as the Taliban changed its strategic approach to 
indirect, blending into the population and employing insurgent tactics. Despite this 
change, the U.S. failed to adapt its conflict approach. From January 2002–June 2003, the 
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force structure in Afghanistan grew from just over 4,000 service members to almost 
10,000, commanded by a conventional commander.81 This drastic increase in forces, 
accompanied by a shift in command-and-control methods, degraded the very agile, 
specialized force capable of direct or indirect action and essentially replaced it with a 
less-agile force suited to direct conflict.  
2. Freedom of Maneuver 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, marked the first time since World 
War II that the American homeland had been attacked on a large scale. The wounds 
inflicted that day united the government and public in demanding action against the 
perpetrators. Initially, the military enjoyed broad freedom of maneuver, politically and 
physically, to pursue and target Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and the Taliban that supported 
them. This latitude diminished over time, for several reasons. First, the rationale for the 
war in Afghanistan was to bring the operatives that perpetrated the 9/11 attacks to justice. 
In February 2002, a U.S. military contingent missed the opportunity to kill or capture 
Osama Bin Laden in the mountains around Shi-e-Kot, Afghanistan, during Operation 
Anaconda, a hammer-and-anvil operation devised by the 10th Mountain Division.82 “The 
U.S. military attempted to apply a direct solution against an unconventional enemy much 
like it did in Vietnam. In fact, it handed al Qaeda a moral victory, with many escaping or 
staying hidden.”83 
This missed opportunity was costly, allowing the Taliban and Al Qaeda to 
regroup and adjust their conflict approach thereby providing the second reason for the 
U.S.’s diminished freedom of maneuver.  
Following Operation Anaconda, the enemy no longer engaged directly. For the 
remainder of the war, the Taliban fought through indirect, small-scale attacks that slowly 
eroded the U.S. will to fight and left policymakers and the public restless. The early 
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triumph in Afghanistan brought the conflict into the spotlight,84 but the public 
subsequently saw the war drag on, with troop numbers increasing by about 6,000 from 
2002–2003 and increasing casualty rates due to the adversary’s indirect strategy. The cost 
of blood and treasure without any measureable success frustrated the American people 
and reduced the U.S. will to continue the fight. A conflict between the last remaining 
world superpower and a small organization with limited regional power ultimately 
became America’s longest war, which continues nearly fifteen years later.  
Over time, the failure of the United States to kill or capture Osama bin Laden, 
defeat the Taliban, and wrap up the war reduced freedom of maneuver to pursue policy 
goals in Afghanistan. The introduction of large-scale conventional forces started a timer 
on political will. Conventional boots on the ground represented a very large investment 
by the United States and, without commensurate large-scale gains, created 
disappointment that eventually undermined political will, policy goals, and freedom of 
maneuver, due to conspicuous mishandling of the military instrument of national 
power.85 
3. Resource Allocation 
Early on, the U.S. military enjoyed nearly unlimited willingness to expend 
resources on the conflict in Afghanistan. A massive terrorist attack had resolved the 
nation and its allies to commit military resources against Al Qaeda and their affiliates; the 
day after 9/11, the DOD was working on plans to send conventional units to 
Afghanistan.86 Preliminary concepts from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff called 
for a base in Uzbekistan, supplied by sixty-seven massive cargo aircraft to move the 
supplies needed for an air campaign.87 This aggressive planning in the immediate 
aftermath of the attacks illustrates that budgetary considerations were not a limitation in 
creating a military response. The NCA and the public demanded reprisals and were 
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willing to pay for them. As the military failed to decapitate AQ, hope of a rapid 
resolution dimmed in the months that followed the attacks on the World Trade Center and 
Pentagon. Resources allocation changed when the war in Iraq began, in March 2003.88 
With the priority on Iraq and waning political will for Afghanistan, resource allocation 
was significantly reduced. 
4. The Importance of the Objective 
The importance of the objective in Afghanistan followed a similar trajectory to 
resource allocation. Afghanistan itself was not of critical importance to the U.S., but 
pursuing Al Qaeda and affiliates was deemed critical to national security, and 
Afghanistan exported terrorism.89 This thesis views the war in Afghanistan as a hybrid 
case. The survival of the U.S. may never have been in question, but the importance of the 
objective was nevertheless initially high; and as costs increased and the fight continued, 
the perceived importance of the objective waned. After the invasion of Iraq, Afghanistan 
became an “economy of force” effort.  
5. Analysis 
Owing to the surprising and devastating nature of the 9/11 attacks, those pursuing 
policy objectives in Afghanistan experienced complete political freedom of maneuver but 
limited capability to respond conventionally. Conventional forces could not respond 
rapidly enough and the U.S. was forced to use a smaller, specialized force in the form of 
the CIA and USSF to meet policy demands. Over time, political freedom became 
restricted while the flow of resources into Afghanistan increased, at least until the war in 
Iraq began.  
Similarly, the willingness of the government and people to commit resources was 
almost unlimited in the beginning. As expectations that U.S. power advantages would 
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quickly defeat Al Qaeda and the Taliban were dashed, government and public willingness 
to commit resources to a frustrating conflict declined. While the importance of the 
objective was at first regarded as extremely high, despite no existential threat to national 
survival, the lack of decisive gains diminished the objective’s importance, especially as a 
much larger and costlier conflict in Iraq expanded.  
After March 2003, freedom of maneuver became limited in Afghanistan, 
committing and expending further resources was unpalatable to those in power due to the 
high blood and treasure costs.90 Ultimately, the objective lost importance. These factors 
effectively tied the hands of those striving for policy resolution in Afghanistan. Evolving 
policy and popular will created a situation in which NCA strategic goals could not be 
achieved and the environment became so confining that any military action taken, 
however successful, reaped negative consequences.  
In 2009, in a speech delivered at West Point, the President Barack Obama 
announced the plan to surge U.S. military forces to Afghanistan to reverse the stalemate 
that plagued Afghanistan from 2007–2008.91 Under this plan, the president outlined three 
objectives intended to defeat Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and to protect America and its 
allies from future Al Qaeda attacks:92 
1. Deny Al Qaeda a safe haven in Afghanistan 
2. Reverse the Taliban’s momentum and deny its ability to overthrow the 
Afghan government. 
3. Build capacity of Afghan security forces and the government. 
To achieve these objectives, the surge increased U.S. military forces in Afghanistan from 
approximately 41,000 to 100,000 troops. Monetary expenditures increased from 48 
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billion dollars from 2007–2009 to 109 billion dollars from 2010–2012.93 An arbitrary 
drawdown was announced to begin in the summer of 2011 with the surge. The surge’s 
focus was to create freedom of maneuver in a campaign that had been neglected since the 
invasion of Iraq.  
The surge appears to have created limited success in terms of the objectives 
outlined by the president, but did not change the negatively trending security 
environment overall. The Taliban, who were not a threat to national security, were 
pushed out of parts of central Afghanistan, but remained a viable threat along the border 
of Pakistan and remained capable of threatening the central government in Kabul. 
Although the U.S. did eventually kill Osama bin Laden, Al Qaeda remained a viable, 
though reduced threat to the U.S. and its allies. With the announcement of an arbitrary 
withdrawal date, a visible timeline limited U.S. chances of achieving success.94 The 
surge exhausted the American public’s already thin patience with the Afghan war, further 
reducing U.S. freedom of maneuver.95 Ironically, the reduction in freedom of maneuver 
has forced the U.S. into a more indirect strategic interaction in Afghanistan and may 
force the U.S. to adopt an approach with a higher probability of success. 
B. IRAQ 
Planning for the intervention in Iraq began in the fall of 2001, when Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld directed Central Command to develop a strategy to unseat 
Saddam Hussein.96 Planners counted on the experience gained in the first Iraq war and 
anticipated that after defeating the Iraqi forces, a quick transition would occur, in which 
Hussein would be removed, civil authority would be handed to a friendly Iraqi entity, and 
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the U.S. would focus on helping rebuild Iraq.97 Thus, the DOD never developed a serious 
plan for conflict termination and the withdrawal of major combat forces from Iraq.98 
However, the Department of State anticipated tough post-conflict challenges and 
developed plans that complemented DOD’s, but were not collaborative.  
The DOS believed that post-Hussein reconstruction in Iraq would be complex and 
messy. In January 2003, National Security Presidential Directive 24 (NSPD 24) resolved 
these divergent opinions by calling on the DOD to establish an office for reconstruction 
and humanitarian assistance, to be led by a retired Army general reporting directly to the 
secretary of defense. Conditions were set for a very conventional, direct conflict to 
invade Iraq, secure Baghdad, and replace Hussein.99 On March 20, 2003, the U.S.-led 
coalition attacked Iraq. By April 30—less than six weeks from the introduction of 
forces—the invasion was complete and the U.S. unexpectedly found itself in a rapidly 
changing environment for which it was not prepared.100 Ultimately, this case study will 
show that the U.S. did not adapt its strategic approach to the burgeoning insurgency. The 
U.S. reticence to change its approach and the continued use of large-scale conventional 
forces executing a direct strategic interaction contributed to U.S. failure to achieve its 
policy goals.  
1. Conflict Interaction 
The conflict in Iraq evolved, exhibiting three types of warfare—conventional, 
insurgency, and civil—each of which called for a different methodology for resolution.101 
What started as an interstate, conventional war quickly turned into an insurgency once the 
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regime fell, and then into civil war.102 At the conflict’s inception, large formations of 
mechanized, motorized, and light infantry hammered it out with elements of the Iraqi 
army, while coalition airpower struck strategic targets to weaken the Iraqi military. After 
Hussein fell, the U.S. faced an insurgency that lasted until roughly 2006.103 In that year, 
the U.S. became involved in an emerging civil war throughout the country, between Al 
Qaeda-affiliated Sunni elements and the predominant Iraqi Shia government. 
Unfortunately, the United States did not keep up with the constant evolving conflict. 
According to Gregg, Rothstein, and Arquilla in The Three Circles of War: 
It appears that the U.S. strategy lagged behind the shifts in the Iraq 
conflict. We were still thinking largely in terms of interstate warfare 
through the first years of the insurgency and redirected ourselves toward 
counter-insurgency only after the conflict had moved from an insurgency 
to a fledgling civil war.104 
This quote summarizes the strategy paradigm throughout the war—elements of all 
three conflict models existed and the U.S. therefore needed a comprehensive but agile 
strategy.105 Nevertheless, the same type of approach was used in all three types of 
warfare. In the initial days of the invasion, the United States employed a strong, capable, 
conventional force against an Iraqi conventional force, using a direct approach. As the 
conflict transformed to an insurgency and the Iraqi army melted away, the U.S. military 
continued a direct approach. The insurgents saw the futility of standing toe to toe against 
overwhelming force. The U.S. found itself engaging with a direct approach while the 
adversary had switched to an indirect approach. The delayed identification of these 
changes allowed the insurgents to gain ground and advantage before the U.S. realized 
what was occurring.106 It was not until 2007 that the U.S. began using counterinsurgency, 
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or COIN, as a methodology to counter the increasing violence. During this period, the 
conflict gave way to civil war.107  
2. Freedom of Maneuver 
The conflict in Iraq was arguably an extension of the war on terrorism in 
Afghanistan and around the world. Though the war was not prosecuted in the direct 
aftermath of 9/11, the generally high political approval for removing Hussein resulted in 
significant freedom of maneuver for the U.S. Over time, however, the Iraq war, like the 
Afghan war, became unpopular. The will to continue shrank, due to elevated costs and 
the seeming endlessness of the conflict. Expectations for a quick resolution were quickly 
washed away by the growing insurgency and a civil war that cost over 4,000 American 
lives and required ever more resources and effort to create a stable security environment 
in which Iraq could be rebuilt. As the political will to carry on dissipated, the president 
vowed to remove all U.S. troops by 2011.108 The U.S. and allies were forced to cease 
combat operations, due to restricted freedom of maneuver. World leaders, to include the 
President of the United States, ordered withdrawals of their forces. In the case of the 
U.S., this withdrawal came with a publicly known date, thereby severely limiting 
freedom of maneuver by the United States.  
3. Resource Allocation 
Resource allocation for the war in Iraq began as nearly unlimited. As the conflict 
progressed from conventional conflict to an ambiguous and complex entanglement, the 
eagerness of the U.S. to invest in the conflict dissipated. The U.S. government began to 
feel the exasperation of the American people at continued expenditure of resources and a 
loss of 4,000-plus lives on a war that seemingly had no end. On August 31, 2010, the 
President of the United Sates announced the end of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and 
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combat operations in Iraq.109 This order was a direct result of the U.S. government, the 
new government of Iraq, and the world at large losing interest in continuing the war. All 
involved were reluctant to commit resources to an unpopular and uncertain war.  
4. The Importance of the Objective 
In the Iraq war, the importance of the objective is not as discernable as the other 
cases in this chapter. Initially, the importance of the objective was critical to the U.S. If 
Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, then Iraq posed a credible threat to the U.S. 
homeland and allies. The initial support garnered for the war effort developed from the 
notion that weapons of mass destruction (WMD) were present in Iraq and that they could 
be used by Iraq or other nefarious actors against the U.S. in retaliation for the now 
burgeoning war GWOT. U.S. intelligence on WMDs, which drove the invasion, proved 
wrong; thus, while the objective was originally perceived as extremely important and a 
major priority thus driving the requirement for a large-scale conventional intervention, 
that status deflated as weapons were not found. As the likelihood that Iraq possessed 
weapons of mass destruction dwindled, the importance of the objective decreased in the 
minds of supporters of the war in the U.S. government and in the American public. As a 
result, the war lost its justification.  
5. Analysis 
Iraq transitioned through three types of warfare during this conflict. The 
American public expected a quick and overwhelming victory based in part on historical 
expectations of the power of the U.S. military and the United States’ experience against 
the Iraqi Army in the first Gulf War. The American expectation of an absolute power 
advantage, regardless of conflict type, vanished quickly as U.S. forces remained long 
after the president declared an end to major combat operations. Public support and 
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likewise, freedom of maneuver quickly waned as a result. The advantages the U.S. 
enjoyed early in 2003 were lost and withdrawal became the goal rather than victory. 
Conflict interactions in Iraq began as direct conventional-warfare, with USSF 
playing a supporting role to conventional forces. The Iraqi Army responded directly and 
was routed by overwhelming force by the Unite States. Once the army was defeated, an 
insurgency emerged—and with it, indirect interaction by the insurgent. The United States 
continued using conventional forces directly, supported by USSF, to little effect. Through 
this interaction, the United States actually exacerbated conditions in Iraq, inadvertently 
encouraging a brewing civil war while slowly compromising the allies’ ability to achieve 
policy objectives. In 2006, ethnic civil war developed, further complicating U.S. efforts 
to bring peace and order. DOD efforts to quell the insurgency and simultaneously stop 
the civil war began to take on an indirect mode, but the strategy was implemented and 
executed in a direct manner by conventional forces supported by USSF.  
Insurgents in Iraq perceived the reduction in U.S. freedom to maneuver, allocation 
of resources, and the importance of the objective, and they exploited these conditions by 
adopting dynamic, indirect tactics well suited to wearing down a superior foe. Ultimately, 
the U.S. withdrew from Iraq, without achieving its goals.  
C. THE PHILIPPINES 
While the United States took on Islamists in Afghanistan and toppled Saddam 
Hussein in Iraq, a quieter confrontation was ongoing in in the Pacific theater, aimed at 
fighting terrorism. The conflict, in the Philippines targeted Al Qaeda affiliates Abu 
Sayaaf Group and Jemaah Islamiyah.110 The U.S. mission in the Philippines became part 
of the rapidly expanding global war on terrorism known as Operation Enduring Freedom. 
American involvement in the Philippine conflict differed markedly from that in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  
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U.S. intervention in the Philippines dates back to 1898 and the Spanish–American 
War, when the U.S. fought Spain over Cuban independence and secured the Philippine 
Islands after defeating the Spanish Navy in the Pacific.111 The United States has 
maintained a generally cooperative relationship with the Philippines, ranging from actual 
governance of the nation to close partnership that includes American military basing for 
better access to the Pacific.112 In 2001, the United States received a request from the 
Philippine government for help in training their national counterterrorist force.113 The 
mission began without fanfare, and was conducted with relatively few soldiers. USSF 
from 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) were deployed and became the primary effort 
in the country.114 The USSF mission took an indirect approach that focused on FID in 
support of Philippine military COIN operations.115 According to LTC Brian Petit, 
The heart of the strategy is based on building relationships, reinforcing 
legitimate institutions, building security-force capabilities, sharing 
intelligence and information, developing focused civil-military programs, 
and aggressively promoting local acts of good governance.116 
Petit affirms that the core strategy in the Philippines was indirect from the 
beginning and much different from the methodologies used in Iraq and Afghanistan. The 
mission in the Philippines was well tailored and viewed as a success by the Philippine 
government.  
1. Conflict Interaction 
The conflict in the Philippines has been indirect largely due to the indirect 
paradigm being the only option due to restrictions imposed by the Philippine government 
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and accepted by the U.S. government. While the U.S. government was invited to help the 
Philippine government, the U.S. was to serve in an advisory and support capacity.  
The Al Qaeda affiliates in the country, most prominently Abu Sayaaf and Jemaah 
Islamiyah, typically hid within the civilian populations of the southern Philippines to 
conduct terrorist activities against the government. The U.S. focus in this conflict was to 
train the Philippine military in COIN operations. Thus, the overall conflict strategic 
interaction was indirect versus indirect, between a strong actor (the U.S.-backed 
government) and weaker actors (Al Qaeda affiliates).  
2. Freedom of Maneuver 
The United States had limited maneuver space in the Philippines from the outset, 
both from a political and physical standpoint. Having involved itself in a large-scale 
conflict in Afghanistan and contemplating opening another front in Iraq, the National 
Command Authorities (NCA) found opening a third theater of large-scale operations 
unpalatable. In addition, the Government of the Philippines restricted political space for 
military operations. The Philippines’ formal request for aid came with stipulations that 
prevented direct-combat operations, thus circumscribing the U.S. role and ability to 
participate in the conflict.117 These restrictions created an environment where American 
freedom of maneuver, from a physical and political standpoint, was limited.  
3. Resource Allocation 
As with the freedom to maneuver, the resources available and U.S. willingness to 
expend them remained constrained in the Philippines. Afghanistan and Iraq consumed 
massive military resources. The United States had few remaining tangible assets to 
dedicate and was furthermore unwilling to spend resources in an obscure campaign while 
problems in Afghanistan and Iraq grew intractably complex. As a result, the conflict in 
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the Philippines is distinguished by the small element of SOF assigned to the mission, the 
indirect nature of operations, and limited freedom of maneuver.118 
4. The Importance of the Objective 
The U.S. became involved in the Philippines by request. The goals and objectives 
of a longtime ally aligned with urgent U.S. interests, in that insurgent groups in the 
Philippines were affiliated with Al Qaeda and therefore tied to the GWOT. Insurgents in 
the Philippines never posed an existential threat to the United States, nor was there a 
critical requirement to respond to a major terrorist attack on the American homeland that 
originated from the Philippines. Therefore, the importance of the objective in the 
Philippines began low and remained low throughout the campaign.  
5. Analysis 
The Philippine conflict exhibits similarities with the other cases studied. All three 
involved the U.S. in counterinsurgency operations against an enemy employing indirect 
means; all three conflicts involved weaker opponents; and all three conflicts focused on 
attacking Al Qaeda and its affiliates. However, that is where the comparisons end. The 
conflict in the Philippines began as an insurgency and remained so for the duration of the 
conflict, whereas the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan both evolved in conflict type 
during their course.  
Andre Beaufre’s metrics (freedom of maneuver, available resources, and 
importance of the objective) began and remained limited during the conflict. Due to U.S. 
constraints imposed by the Government of the Philippines and priority commitments in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, freedom of maneuver, politically and physically, was limited. 
Restrictions on combat operations forced the United States to assume an indirect strategy, 
and involvement in two highly visible wars both limited the American presence and 
necessitated an indirect approach.  
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Because the objectives in the Philippines were limited, the military response was 
modest and indirect. A small group of special-operations personnel, spearheaded by a 
USSF group, was authorized to use indirect methods and did so successfully and without 
fanfare. 
6. Conclusion 
This chapter discussed types of interaction and Beaufre’s metrics for three 
conflicts in the global war on terrorism. In Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. freedom of 
maneuver became severely constrained, the importance of the overall objective dwindled 
and the allocation of resources and willingness to expend resources plummeted. In the 
Philippines, the U.S. began the conflict with limited freedom of maneuver, limited 
resources, and an objective with limited importance, none of which changed during the 
course of conflict.  
In Afghanistan, the U.S. strategy changed frequently. The conflict began with few 
constraints, using a hybrid methodology of direct-conflict interaction executed by USSF 
and their partners against an enemy using a direct-conflict methodology. Nevertheless, it 
quickly evolved to where conventional forces were employed directly against an 
insurgency operating indirectly. As a result of this strategic interaction, the U.S. was 
unable to achieve its goals in Afghanistan and has steadily withdrawn troops, hoping to 
end its involvement as soon as politically possible.  
In Iraq as well, changes were required in military strategy for conflict resolution. 
As in Afghanistan, the U.S. initially enjoyed unlimited freedom of maneuver, near 
limitless resources, and an important objective. A very conventional and deliberate direct 
vs. direct conflict was fought against the Iraqi army, which the United States soundly 
won, quickly achieving the objective of toppling Saddam Hussein. As the conflict 
mutated into an insurgency and civil war, U.S. freedom of maneuver, importance of the 
objective and willingness to expend resources was reduced. However, the United States 
continued to use conventional forces, supported by USSF, in what had become direct vs. 
indirect interaction. Ultimately, time ran out. The U.S. downsized its presence in Iraq 
under presidential order without having achieved its desired end states.  
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Alternatively, in the Philippines, the U.S. experienced a successful campaign, in 
which the Beaufre metrics supported an indirect approach. Both the U.S. and the enemy 
employed indirect strategies and, over time, the U.S. achieved success as the conflict had 
gone unnoticed by the American public and international community. In the Philippines, 
the U.S. was able to employ USSF indirectly in a small footprint where it could operate 
almost indefinitely and achieve success avoiding any domestic political pressure.  
These cases validate Ivan Arreguín-Toft’s central thesis that if a strong actor 
encounters a weaker actor and uses the same strategic approach, the advantage lies with 
the stronger actor. Using an indirect approach against an adversary using an indirect 
approach increases the likelihood of achieving strategic effects and greatly expands the 
time available for the strong actor to achieve these effects. Additionally, the application 
of Beaufre’s metrics suggests that where freedom of maneuver is limited, willingness to 
expend resources is low, and the importance of the objective is low, employing a large 
force that requires national support only serves to reduce the amount of time an actor has 
to achieve success in a conflict. As a result, that actor’s overall likelihood for of victory 
against an opponent using an indirect strategy is reduced. The next chapter, and 
conclusion to this thesis, will more precisely identify when Special Forces offer an option 
for conflict resolution and when the U.S. government should consider using USSF in a 




This thesis examines whether Special Forces offer the NCA a superior alternative 
to conventional military forces in prosecuting indirect conflicts under certain conditions. 
For purposes of analysis, it is assumed that USSF may offer strategic advantages when 
other potential responses are limited. To test this hypothesis and identify relevant 
conditions that may indicate indirect action as the preferred approach, “indirect conflict” 
is defined and its use by a host of actors in the last hundred years is discussed. Also 
examined are the organization and capabilities of USSF, how Special Forces may be best 
deployed, and whether indirect strategies have yielded significant advantage. Three case 
studies are used to compare results and suggest optimal practices for achieving policy 
goals.  
A. RESEARCH QUESTION  
The question considered is whether Special Forces offer policymakers an 
effective and efficient alternative to general-purpose forces in certain contexts and, if so, 
under what conditions do these advantages emerge?  
This research provisionally accepts Beaufre’s conditional metrics as a point of 
departure. Beaufre’s research predicts that USSF can be more successful than general 
forces in achieving policy goals under the following environmental conditions: 
1. Freedom of maneuver is restricted. 
2. Resources are constrained due to physical, fiscal, and or political 
limitations. 
3. The objective is less than vital to the national interest or national survival. 
To test this hypothesis, the evolution of indirect strategy is analyzed and recent 
case studies involving the United States, between 2001 and 2013, are provided. The 
organizational design of USSF, its two core missions, and their application in an indirect 
context are also examined.  
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1. Case Studies 
The cases reviewed represent situations in which the U.S. faced an adversary that 
was significantly weaker by conventional standards. These cases were analyzed 
according to type and evolution of conflict interaction. Beaufre’s conflict metrics were 
applied and the force structure used by the U.S. to prosecute the conflict was examined.  
2. Summary and Determinations 
Indirect conflict is becoming the strategy of choice for weak actors. Alarmingly, 
strong actors are also losing to weak actors more frequently.119 That a strong actor such 
as the U.S. be capable of choosing and implementing an indirect strategy is shown as 
critical in dynamic security environments. Few adversaries possess the means or will to 
engage in full-scale conventional confrontation with a strong actor, and the U.S. absolute 
power advantage makes a direct strategy untenable for weak challengers. Thus, indirect 
strategies are the preferred, and often the only, tool for weak actors. Alarmingly, strong 
actors such as the U.S. find it increasingly challenging to defeat weak enemies. Ivan 
Arreguín-Toft’s research indicates that in conflicts where a strong actor applies a direct 
approach against a weak actor’s indirect approach, the strong actor will lose 63 percent of 
the time.120 This statistic should serve as a wakeup call for all strong actors. Considering 
the historical scorecard, strong actors should also be aware that in small wars, an absolute 
power advantage might be a hindrance as much as a benefit. Given the increasing losses 
of strong actors, Arreguín-Toft identifies a need for the strong to wield two forces: one 
with which to counter conventional threats, wage traditional interstate warfare, and deter 
other strong actors; and one that is insidious—which does not seek to destroy the enemy 
outright, but rather attacks those elements that encourage the enemy’s will to fight.121 
Arreguín-Toft recommends that the latter force be capable of implementing indirect 
strategies against weak actors employing indirect approaches.122 He asserts that the 
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strong force must be able to recognize when an indirect strategy is appropriate and 
employ its indirect force within that context.  
In the United States DOD, the USSF already exists mostly as an indirect force. 
Unfortunately, in Afghanistan and Iraq, policy and USSF decision makers strongly 
preferred using this indirect force in a direct manner, producing sub-optimal results. The 
odds of defeating a weak adversary can be improved123 if glamorous direct approaches 
are resisted and tedious, but effective, indirect approaches are allowed to work. The 
temptation to use Special Forces in a direct manner first may be overcome by identifying 
this phenomenon and discouraging124 reflexive deployments by educating decision and 
policymakers about USSF capabilities and strategy options. It is important to note that the 
U.S. used USSF in an indirect approach in the Philippines. The U.S. was compelled to 
adopt this approach due to constraints placed on the U.S. by the Philippine Government. 
The U.S. was invited to provide training and assistance to Philippine security forces 
addressing terror related challenges in that country. The Philippine Government limited 
the United States’ freedom of maneuver and compelled the U.S. to use the correct 
strategic approach, which was ultimately successful.  
Confronted with an indirect threat and a choice between direct and indirect 
strategies, this thesis recommends that the U.S. follow a decision process that first 
considers the domestic and international political climates. If the use of conventional 
forces would escalate the conflict to undesirable levels or disrupt world politics such that 
sanctions and restrictions are subsequently placed on the U.S., an indirect strategy should 
be preferred. Similarly, if the U.S. is short of resources (or willingness to use its 
resources), whether because of economic constraints, limited political support, or the 
need for a low visibility option, an indirect strategy should be strongly considered. 
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Finally, if the objective is not of great importance and the survival of the U.S. or allies are 
not at stake, an indirect strategy may be expected to best attain policy goals.  
Although this research finds freedom of maneuver the most critical variable in 
Beaufre’s model, all three variables must be in play for in the strong actor’s decision to 
take an indirect approach. Beaufre’s variables are found in the three cases analyzed using 
Arreguín-Toft’s model. In nearly all cases involving strong and weak actors, the strong 
encountered a reduction in freedom of maneuver, displayed reluctance to begin or 
continue spending resources, and had judged that national survival was not in jeopardy. 
An example from Arreguín-Toft is Russia’s involvement in the Murid War in the 
Caucasus from 1830–1859. Russia’s interest lay in its desire to protect the region that 
now is the nation of Georgia.125 In the course of the conflict, Russia reduced its 
operational space by pursuing barbaric practices (total war including punitive retaliatory 
attacks) against the Murids. Thus, despite military superiority, the Russians experienced 
diminished effectiveness and strengthened support for Murid leadership through 
inappropriate direct strategies.126 The case studies in this thesis support the lessons 
derived from this anecdote concerning the vital importance of the type of strategic 
interaction chosen.  
B. EXISTING CAPABILITIES  
Arreguín-Toft’s conclusions promoting a U.S. military force dedicated to indirect 
warfare are supported by this research. Such a force, however, already exists within the 
Department of Defense in the form of USSF, and that American Special Forces have 
proven themselves capable of implementing successful indirect strategies. The nature, 
organizational design, and primary functions of USSF represent a viable alternative when 
the NCA requires economy of force and reduced risk in meeting policy goals. While this 
research does not suggest that conventional forces cannot implement or succeed using an 
indirect strategy, this thesis asserts that the intensive training and selection of USSF 
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personnel uniquely prepare them for indirect action with minimal political and military 
risk, within a defined context.127 The core mission of USSF—unconventional warfare—
is squarely within the domain of indirect conflict. These missions offer the NCA a 
vehicle towards success in conflicts and align with Beaufre’s criteria.  
The small numbers of USSF and their ability to remain largely unseen reduce the 
risk of conflict escalation to levels that require conventional interaction. USSF relies 
largely on surrogate forces in the form of specially trained military elements from the 
host nation, thus ensuring that the majority of tactical participants are familiar and 
acceptable. This low signature reduces the chance of the U.S. being pulled into a broader 
conflict. Likewise, USSF’s low visibility approach to achieving results allows the U.S. to 
maximize political maneuver space and minimize cost. This buys time, as minimized 
spending is less likely to excite political opposition (as conventional forces expenditures 
typically do), thereby extending the time available to achieve goals.  
While the capabilities of the USSF are clear, decision makers must resist the 
common temptation to use a direct approach to resolve all types of conflict, including 
those against a weaker actor. The free-lunch effect, whereby the reliable USSF is seen as 
a quick and easy direct tool, must be strongly rejected.128 While USSF have unique 
capabilities, they also have significant limitations when improperly employed.  
C. CASE-STUDY SUMMARY 
This thesis has looked at three recent cases to assess USSF advantages: the war in 
Afghanistan, the war in Iraq, and the conflict in the Philippines.  
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1. The War in Afghanistan 
The conflict in Afghanistan began with direct conflict on both sides. Although the 
preponderance of U.S. forces in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2002 were members of 
Special Operations, the strategy pursued by the U.S. was direct. USSF paired with 
members of the Northern Alliance and conducted conventional and effective direct action 
attacks against a weaker state actor also employing a direct strategy. In December 2001, 
the Taliban switched to an indirect strategy after a series of defeats. The U.S. continued 
direct engagement, using conventional forces to attack Taliban strongholds and using 
USSF with their Afghan counterparts to do the same. The U.S. pursued a direct-versus-
indirect strategy with large conventional forces violating Beaufre’s strategy model. The 
U.S. experienced reduced freedom of maneuver, a significant decrease in resources 
available (resulting from the 2003 Iraq invasion) and a decline in the importance of 
conflict after Osama bin Laden escaped into Pakistan. The resulting strategic setting for 
the U.S. had changed. In 2009, the U.S. conducted a surge and placed a timeline for 
withdrawal from Afghanistan.129 The surge did little to increase political will in the U.S. 
and ultimately force levels dwindled. Now, the Taliban is returning in strength. 
2. The War in Iraq  
As in Afghanistan, the U.S. demonstrated limited ability to adjust its mode of 
strategic interaction to the adversary’s strategic evolution. While at the outset, the U.S. 
enjoyed near-limitless freedom of maneuver, as the conflict evolved from conventional to 
insurgent to civil war, the U.S. failed to modify its strategic interaction.  
The U.S. initially achieved overwhelming victory against the Iraqi army in a 
direct conventional fight. However, the conflict interaction changed and the U.S. found 
itself embroiled in an insurgency for which the U.S. was not prepared. As the conflict 
continued well past initial expectations, freedom of maneuver was reduced for the United 
States and a resulting waning willingness to pour resources into Iraq. As a result, the U.S. 
fell short of its desired policy goals. The expected absolute power advantage of the U.S. 
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did not lead to the immediate expected victory. As a result, the U.S. withdrew from Iraq 
without achieving its goals.  
3. The War in the Philippines 
The Philippine government invited the U.S. in to provide advisory assistance to its 
military as it conducted a counterinsurgency campaign. The Philippine government 
limited U.S. freedom of maneuver. Additionally, U.S. resources were limited due to 
competing priorities and the Philippine turmoil was not an existential threat. Accordingly, 
this case was ideal for USSF using an indirect approach supporting Beaufre’s strategic 
model. Consistent with the hypothesis of this research, the U.S. and USSF enjoyed 
excellent success in achieving policy goals in the Philippines.  
D. INSIGHTS 
These cases suggest an inverse relationship between time and footprint: if a strong 
actor’s force is large, the expectations raised by its absolute power advantage 
significantly reduce the timeframe for achieving success. If the footprint is small, 
expectations are limited and the actor can execute a protracted campaign. This point is 
critical, as the average duration of an insurgency is 118 months.130  
This thesis urges that the deployment of USSF, using indirect strategies, be 
strongly considered in appropriate circumstances. It is the opinion of the author that the 
United States would likely have achieved greater success in Afghanistan and Iraq through 
indirect strategies carried out by USSF. The research finds that USSF is more likely to 
achieve superior results if employed to best advantage—as an agile force able to adapt to 
enemy changes—using an indirect approach. Furthermore, Beaufre’s strategic model is 
compelling for determining when indirect approaches offer the best policy option.  
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E. CONCLUSION 
Historical trends highlight an increased need to consider indirect strategies to 
counter indirect threats.131 This thesis finds that USSF as presently structured are ideally 
optimized for indirect strategic action, with advantages over conventional forces, where 
freedom of maneuver is limited, the will to devote resources is limited, and national 
survival is not at stake. This thesis recommends that USSF be employed judiciously in 
indirect strategies in support of U.S. policy objectives.  
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